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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird das Problem der Überwachung des spaltbaren
Materials in einer Zentrifugenanlage mit Hilfe der Materialbilanzierung
analysiert. Es wird eine Referenzanlage mit einer Trennarbeitskapazität
von 600 t U/Jahr und einem Materialfluß-Schema, wie man es sich heute vor-
stellt, betrachtet. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wird die Frage der Genauigkeit
der Materialbilanz mit Hilfe von neu entwickelten statistischen Methoden unter-
sucht: Die auf ein Jahr bezogene Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit wird als Funk-
tion des Fehlers 1. Art, der Zahl der Inventuren und des pro Jahr als ent-
wendet angenommenen Betrages spaltbaren Materials berechnet. Im zweiten Teil
werden verschiedene Möglichkeiten der Verifikation von Betreiberdaten be-
trachtet. Es wird gezeigt, daß es genügt, die Brutto-Gewichte der UF6-Zylinder
mit einer groben Waage unter Verwendung der Methode der Vorzeichentests sowie
die Anreicherung der Produkt- und Tails-Ströme zu prüfen. Es ist festzuhalten,
daß die in dieser Arbeit niedergelegten Gedanken noch nicht als endgültig
anzusehen sind; weitere Arbeiten werden folgen.
Abstract
In this paper the problem of safeguarding the nuclear material in a centrifuge
plant with the help of material accountancy is analysed. A reference plant
with a separative work of 600 t U/yr and a material flow scheme as it is seen
today is considered. In the first part the question of the accuracy of the
material balance is analysed with the help of recently developed techniques:
the probability of detection per year is determined as a function of the error
of the first kind, the number of inventories and the amount assumed to be di-
verted per year. In the second part different possibilities for the verification
of the operator's reported data are considered. It is shown that it is sufficicnt
to check the gross weights of the UF6 cylinders with a rough balance by using
the slgn test method and furthermore to check the enrichment of the product
and tail streams on a random sampling basis either. It is to be noted that
the ideas presented ln this paper are not yet fully developed; further work
is in progress.
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1. Introduction
With centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment attracting commercial interest,
various safeguards problems considered to be associated with such plants
are expected to be examined from all sides for some time to come. For an
international safeguards system with material accounting as the main safe-
guards measure, the Material Unaccounted For (MUF: differencebetween book
and physical inventory) has been recognized to be the primary technical safe-
guards indicator /1/. An attempt has been made in this paper to analyse the
various components of MUF in a centrifuge plant. The influence of measure-
ment uncertainties and the number of physical inventories per year on the
amounts of material which can be declared as missing or diverted for a given
set of a and ß error, has been discussed on the basis of data developed for
a reference centrifuge plant. Some preliminary thoughts have been examined on
the possible extent of actual inspection efforts in the reference plant. It is
to be noted that the ideas expressed here are at an initial stage of development
and further work is in progress.
1)Paper presented at the IAEA Working Group Meeting on Safeguards
procedures for Isotopic Enrichment Facilities, 12.- 16.6.72 in Vienna.
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2. Referenee plant
The same referenee plant used as a basis for the development of a material
accountancy strueture /2/ forms the basis in this ease also. All relevant
data on this plant are presented in Table 1. The flow seheme is reproduced
in Fig. from /2/.
The input to the plant has been assumed to be 10 t UF6 eylinders as a bateh
with natural uranium eoneentration. The eylinders are transferred to the feed
station, weighed, heated up, sampled for ehemieal and isotopic analysis if re-
quired and condensed into the desublimators over the vaeuum system to remove
traees of HF and then fed in gaseous form into the easeade by-passing the
desublimators. A small fraetion of HF/UF6 mixture over the desublimators
goes over to the vaeuum traps and is removed periodieally. The amounts held up
in these traps are not known aeeurately. They go to the decontamination system
from time to time and leave the plant in the form of water slurries.The total
amount of such wastes is not expeeted to be more than 0.5 %of the feed and
will also have natural eoneentration. Bateh size for the stream has been assumed
to be 1.5 tons. The total amount and the U-235 eoncentration are expeeted to be
measured for eaeh bateh.
After enriehment, the produet and tail streams are eondensed in the respective
desublimators before being transferred to the output cylinders at the produet
and the tails stations respeetively. There they are weighed and sampled for
chemieal and isotopie analysis when necessary, and transferred to storage.
The product is expeeted to be stored in 2 ton cylinders for UF6 ' the tail in
10 ton emptied feed eylinders. Eaeh of these make a bateh.
The referenee plant has been divided into two Material Balance Areas (MBA)
for safeguards aecountancy purposes namely, the storage and the process MBA.
They are reprodueed along with the Key Measurement Points from /2/ in Fig. 2.
The dotted area around the easeade lS assumed to be inaeeessible for inspeetion
and houses the separating eentrifuges in the easeade and the maintenanee and
test areas for eentrifuges.
It is to be noted that all the intermediate storage vessels like sUblimators,
traps etc., expected to have any significant uranium hold-up are loeated in
the accessible part of the process MBA and are subject to inspeetions.
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3. Analysis of the MUF components
In an analysis of the available data on MUF for facilities in the open part
of the fuel cycle /3,4/, it was shown that both the measurement errors
for throughput and inventory measurements as weIl as process para-
meters can contribute to the variance and the expectation value of the MUF.
All relevant data which influence the establishment of material balance
and therefore the MUF in the reference centrifuge plant, are presented in
Table 2 for throughput measurements and in Table 3 for inventory determina-
tions. The values of measurement errors in Table 2 are partly from /5/ and part-
ly based on actual performances of a test cascade. Only the values on waste
measurements are pure estimates as no actual measurement experience exists
at present. They may change as experience grows. The data on inventories
in Table 3 are mostly estimates based on pilot plant experience. They may
also be altered in the course of further experience.
3.1 Contribution to the variance of MUF
With the conditions laid down in Table 2 and 3 it can be seen that the follow-
ing components contribute to the variance of MUF.
a) The relative standard deviations (RSD) of random components of measurements
for all the input and output batches (Table 2).
However, because of the large number of batches measured for the feed,
product and tail streams and the low values of the respective RSDs,
their contribution to the total variance may be small. On the other hand,
the random error contribution from the waste stream measurements can be
high because of fairly small number of batches and normally high value of
RSD for this error.
b) The RSD for systematic error for all the different throughput measurements
(Table 2).
The contribution of these types of errors may be reduced or eliminated
if same measurement instruments and standards are used for the input and
output measurements. For the reference plant the systematic errors in the
chemical analysis are eliminated in this manner since the same measuring
system has been assumed to be used for the feed, product and tail streams
and the systematic errar of measurement has been assumed ta be proportional
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to the measured amounts. Similarly, any systematic error in weighing is
al 1 · · d+) H' .so e ~m~nate • owever, ~n the mass-spectrometr~cmeasurements, the
systematic error associated with the measurement standards has not been
eliminated since different mass-spectrometers using different standards
are assumed to be used for different streams to avoid cross contamination
and memory effects. Also, the systematic error in the measurement of waste
streams cannot be eliminated.
c) The RSD for systematic errors for all inventory amounts (Table 3).
Under normal conditions two types of inventory taking have been considered
for the reference plant. The first type consists of an accurate measurement
of the process inventory and supposed to be carried out once a year.
The desublimators are emptied and the only inventories remaining in
the process MBA are those in the feed, product and tail cylinders
flanged at the respective stations, the gas phase inventory in the
cascade, the uranium inventory in the vacuum traps and the hidden inven-
tory in form of solid uranium deposits on various parts of the process
area. Excepting the last, all the other inventory items are assumed to
be measured with RSDs of systematic error components as shown in Table 3.
The contribution of these errors (because of the small amounts involved
and relatively good accuracy) to the total standard deviation of MUF is
negligible.
The second type of inventory taking consists of an estimation of the desubli-
mator contents at more frequent intervals (1-7 times/yr in addition to the
once-a-year accurate inventory taking). As shown later, such a procedure causes
a marked reduction in the amount of material which will be denoted by M in the
following for which a statement for diversion (or loss) can be made with a
given set of a and ß errors.++) For this inventory taking, the time is so
chosen that the content of the flanged cylinders at the input and output
stations can be added to the throughput measurements (instead of to the in-
ventory as in the case of the first type of inventory taking). The process
inventories under such a condition are those in the desublimators, the gas
phase inventory in the cascade, the uranium inventory in the vacuum traps and
the solid phase hidden inventory. With the assumed RSDs for systematic errors
for this type of inventories, the standard deviations for the inventory are
approximately of the same order of magnitude (particularly for inventories
of 4 or more/yr.) as that obtained for the throughput measurement for the
same period.
+) For a detailed explanation, see the comment in section 5 of Annex 1.
++) The definitionsof a and ß are given in the Annexes.
Both the inventories are expected to be taken without stopping the operation
of the plant. The contribution of the standard deviation of measurement for
the UF6 stored in the three storage areas has not been considered as their
influence cancels on balancing since it is assumed that the same amounts are
kept in the storage at the beginning end end of a balancing period.
3.2 Contribution to the expectation value of MUF
All contributions to the expectation value of MUF (EMUF) in the reference
centrifuge plant are expected to be from the process parameters. They are
a) heels in feed cylinders
b) gas phase inventory in the cascade (if inventory is taken during the
operation of a plant)
c) solid phase hidden inventory ln the process area
d) hold up of vacuum and other traps under equilibrium conditions.
The heel losses have been assumed to occur mainly at the feed end as the
cleaning of cylinders are expected to take place at the shipper's facility.
Whatever the magnitude of these losses may be, since they are known they
need not cause any concern for safeguards. The gas phase inventory, taken
to be 120 kgsof UF6 for the reference plant, is very low compared to the
throughput (feed 1700 t UF6/yr) and is expected to be fairly constant
(! 12 kgs UF6) during the normal operation of the plant. It is also fairly
unimportant fromthe point of view of safeguards.
The solid phase hidden inventory has been taken to be slightly more than
twice the gas phase hidden inventory in the cascade and is based on small
scale test cascade performance. The major fraction of the solid phase non-
separating inventory is expected to be built up during the initial time of
the cascade operation and the build up is expected to slow down considerably
for the rest of the plant operation time being mainly governed by the leakrate
for the whole plant, Since a high in-leakage of air and heavy deposition of
uranium in the centrifuges, reduce the efficiency of a centrifuge in a signifi-
cant manner /2/, the solid phase, non-separating hidden inventory cannot be
permitted to increase continuously to high values. A proper analysis of this
category is however necessary, on the basis of historical data and plant
performance, to assaSB its contribution to the EMUF and the safeguards activity.
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The last category of inventory consisting of equilibrium hold-up in
vacuum and other traps does not represent an amount which remains
permanently unknown and unregistered as in the case of the solid
phase hidden inventory, but appears as waste at some time of operation
of the plant. However, the simultaneous dumping of all the traps in
the plant cannot normally be synchronized with a physical inventory
taking so that an equilibrium amount always rema~ns in the plant at
the time of establishing the MUF. As in the case of the hidden inventory,
historical data are required to assess its magnitude and the range of
fluctuations.
It is to be noted that all the categories considered here give a total
amount of 860 kgs of UF6 out of which 480 kgs may be considered to be
known fairly accurately. The rest of 400 kgs (hidden inventory + hold-up
in traps) corresponds to less than 0.05 eff. kgs (assuming natural concen-
tration). An increase of these values by a factor of 2 or 3 will not cause
a significant hazard to safeguards even if apart of these amounts is
assumed to be convertible to 90 %U-235 as shown in /5/.
4. Material balance and critical amounts
It ~s necessary to have some numerical examples for material balance to
assess the influence of the various SDs for throughput and inventory
measurements on the standard deviation of MUF (oMUF)' Another important
parameter for safeguards is the amount of material M which can still be
detected, in case the amount ~s lost or diverted, for a given set of a and
ß errors. Error propagation calculations have been made for the establish-
ment of material balance for a one year reference campaign with the base data
from Tables 1,2 and 3. The amounts of material M (in kg UF6 ) have been cal-
culated for the given set of a and ß values for different numbers of physical
inventory (PI) taking in a year. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5
and Figs. 3 and 4.
It should be noted that in this case it is assumed that the inspector veri-
fies each step necessary for the establishment of the material balance
(i.e. full coverage) that means that he gives no credit at all to the data
reported by the operator. In the next chapter the possibility of random
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sampling from the aide of the inspector has been analysed. In such a
caae the random sampling by the inspector is associated with a broadening
of the uncertainty in the material balance which is equivalent to a larger
amount M for a given set of a and ß values. The broadening of uncertain-
ties means that because of the sampling plan, the operator will be in a
position to falsify the measured data. Such a falsification cannot be
detected by establishing the material balance on the basis of the re-
ported data alone.
Before examining the results presented in Figs. 3 and 4 it is necessary
to lay down the assumptions made for the calculations. The theoretical
basis of these calculations with an example is given in Appendix 1.
4.1 Assumptions for the calculation of o~~ and critical amounts
for different frequencies of physical inventoty taking in the
reference centrifuge plant
a) The batch data and RSDls for throughput and inventory measurements
are given in Tables 2 and 3, unless otherwise stated, with conditions
governing the propagation of systematic errors as given in 3.1 of
this paper.
b) Number of accurate physical inventory (PI) taking is one per year.
Number of estimated physical inventory taking varies between
1-7 per year: e.g. 4 PI!yr means one accurate and 3 estimated
PIls per year.
c) The starting inventory for an intermediate time period has been
calculated on the basis of maximum-likelihood method (Appendix 1).
d) a = ß = 0.05 is valid for aperiod of one year. If M is the amount of
material to be removed from the process over one year and n is the number
of inventories per year, then M/n is the amount to be removed per inven-
tory period, i.e. M is equally distributed over all the inventory periods.
e) Tail cylinders which have been measured in previous inventory periods
and are incidentally stored at the facility under sealed conditions, have
not been considered for inventory taking.
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4.2 Contribution of measurement errors to 0MUF--
The different contributions of the variances of throughput (o~) and inventory
(ai) to the 0MUF are listed in Tables 4 and 5. Following points are of
interest. Some of these have already been discussed in a qualitative manner
under 3.1.
2 2
a) The 01 for accurate PI is about 200 times less than the 0D for one
year (Table 4). In general its contribution to the total 0MUF is
negligibly small. Therefore, the RSDs for the gas phase inventory and
2the hold-ups in traps, which form only apart of the total 01 can also
be considered to be negligible.
b) The ais for the estimated inventories are considerably larger than that
for the accurately measured inventory and their contribution to the 0MUF
increases with increasing number of PI's/yr (Table 4). The major contri-
bution among the various components of the estimated inventory comes from
the variances of the 3 sublimator estimates. Although the actual amounts
of UF6 in each of the sublimators are ten times less than that in the
feed or the tail cylinders, the RSD of the systematic measurement error
is about 75 times worse than those for the feed and the tail cylinders.
Since both the RSD of measurement and the amounts for sublimators are
based on only rough estimations at present, they are expected to improve
experience. In the case of estimated inventory taking also, the
contribution of RSD of 8ystematic errors of measurement for both the gas
phase and the trap inventories are negligible.
c) The RSDs for waste measurement contribute significantly both to 0D and
GMUF (Table 5). For one PI/yr, GD and 0MUF increase by a factor of 2.3,
from the contribution of RSDs for waste measurements alone. For 4 PI/yr
(for which the contribution of GIS from estimated inventories plays an
IIflllClr- .. ant role) the waste contribution is still significant; i.e. in the
range of %. Because ef the small number of batches assumed for the
measurement of the waste stream the centribution of randem error is
also
d) If for
for this measurement
sake the contributien of the standard deviation of the
waste measurement error i8 eliminated, the total 0MUF i8 reduced for a given
number ef PIs/yr. The immediate result kS a marked increase in the probabi-
of PD for a given critical amount M (Table 5). This is
to the statement that for a given PD' the amount of material
eh can be detected if or lost reduces markedly.
4.3. F_umber of inventories and critical amounts
The critical amounts M which can be detected with a = ß =0.05 over
one year for different number of PIs!yr, are shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
A number of interesting points may be noted:
a) For a given M (in the range of 500-1300 kgs UF6!yr) the probability
of detection PD increases with increasing number of inventory taking
n per year (Fig. 3). Qualitatively this is the same trend as was
seen earlier for the improvement of RSD for the waste measurement.
b) For a = ß =0.05 the critical amount M decreases with increasing n
(Fig. 4). This means that the effectiveness of safeguards efforts with
regard to the detection of a critical amount can be improved by taking
2-5 additional estimated, less accurate PIs over and above the one-a-year
accurate PI determination.
c) However, if the critical amount M is set at around 1300 kgs UF6!yr,
corresponding to a maximum of 1.3 effective kgs!yr, increase in the
number of PIs!yr will not bring any significant improvement in PD
(Fig. 4).
5. Estimates of inspection efforts
Because of a number of inherent characteristics of a centrifuge plant,
the verification of material balance information for safeguards accountancy
purposes may not involve highly intensified routine inspection efforts from
an international safeguards authority. For ready reference they are summarized
below:
a) Inventory changes to and from a MBA take place in discrete steps
(feed, product and tail cylinders, waste containers). All throughput
measurements are also in discrete batches.
b) The gas phase inventory in the cascade is negligib~ small and can
be considered to be constant during the operation of a centrifuge
plant. Physical inventories can be made during the operation of the
plant and by proper timing, can be made very small compared to the total
throughput for the same inventory period.
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c) The RSDs of measurements for the main process streams are some
of the best attainable at present under normal plant operating
conditions in a nuclear fuel cycle.
d) The contribution to the 0MUF and EMUF from the various plant parameters
(Table 3) are extremely low and expected to remain weIl within the
RSD of measurement errors.
Some very rough estimates for the extent of routine inspection efforts re-
quired in the reference plant~ have been presented in Table 9. The activities
which form the basis of these estimates are summarized in Table 6. Further-
more, the following assumptions have been made in arriving at these estimates.
i) The reference plant operates on the basis of monthly transports
and supply, i.e. on the average 12 shipments each of feed and product
materials take place per year. The tail cylinders are supposed to be stored
in the storage area under sealed conditions.
ii) All the cylinders in the storage area are weighed with a rough
weighing device by the inspection personneI. The RSD of the weighing
is 20 kgs per weighing (Table 7).
iii) All the cylinders in the storage MBAs are tested by the inspectors
with an enrichment meter for a rough estimation of the U-235 concen-
trat ion. This is carried out not to check the material balance but
to ensure that firstly, no tail cylinders are inadvertently declared
as a feed cylinder and secondly, the product and tail concentrations
do correspond approximately to the declared values.
iv) The chemical concentration of UF6 will not be verified by the inspeetors
sinee the operationally tolerable gaseous impurities are so low that
stoichiometric ratios can be assumed tor inspection purposes.
v) The conditions for random sampling exist for the product and the
tail streams (explained in Annex 3), so that the inspectors can test the
declared data of the plant operator in a random manner. This fact will
be zed by the inspectors to test the operators' data on isotopic
composition of the and (if required) the tail cylinders.
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vi) Since the number of waste containers are expected to be small,
the inspectors will measure the uranium amounts in each container
with the same accuracy as that obtained for plant operation.
With these assumptions and the type of activities mentioned in Table 6,
100-120 inspection mandays appear to be sufficient for routine inspection
activities.
5.1 Sampling effort and critical amounts
It is to be noted that the plant operator establishes the material balance
in the reference plant with the fairly high accuracies mentioned in Tables
2 and 3. In the suggested inspection procedures, the inspector measures the
weight of each of the cylinders independently, however with a lesser accuracy
than that by the operator. Besides, he takes random sampIes to determine the
concentrations in the product and the tail streams. He also measures the
waste streams with the same accuracy as that obtained by the plant operator.
In this scheme of inspection, the plant operator would have two additional
possibilities of diversion besides that obtained by the measurement accuracy
of the material balance. These .are given by the
a) larger measurement uncertainties of weighing by the inspectors
b) extent of random sampling carried out by the inspector.
and can be summarized as strategies of diversion by means of falsification
of reported data. In the framework of the first possibility, the operator
Would be in a position to declare systematically lower amounts of UF6
in feed cylinders and higher amounts of UF6 in the product and tail cylinders
but still remain within the uncertainty of weighing by the inspector. The
difference in the amounts of UF6 thus gained, could be used to produce high
enriched (e.g. 90 %U-235) uranium.
Similarly, if for example, the tolerances for the U-235 concentrations
in the product and the tail streams were to be given to be 1 %and 5 %
respectively, the plant operator vould have the possibility to declare
the concentrations at the lover limit of the tolerance values end use the
difference in a similar manner as in the case of the first possibility.
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It was therefore, thought desirable to estimate the possible extent
and magnitude of the significant amounts which could be diverted in
this manner.
A few preliminary cases were considered. The input data for this consideration
are presented in Table 7. It was assumed that after withdrawal, the UF6
would be enriched to 90 %U-235. The amounts which could thus be obtained
were taken from Table 4 of /5/. The method used to determine the critical
amounts M for the first possibility i9 the 'sign test method' and is discussed
in Annex 2. The other method used to determine the optimum sampling plan
for the second possibility is based on the application of the theory of
games and is shortly sketched in Annex 3.
It is to be emphasized once more that the results are of a very preliminary
nature and at the present stage they illustrate more the application of
the method than the possibility of assessing the inspection effort or of
estimating the effectiveness of a safeguards system.
In Table 8 a few measurement results are given for the sign test. The explana-
tions for the assumptions and numbers are presented in Annex 2 and Table 7.
It is to be noted for example that if more than 55 %of the information sub-
mitted by the operator for the three streams were found to be positive by
the sign test, a statement can be made to the effect that the plant operator
has removed with almost certainty (Pn=1) a critical amount corresponding
to at least 32.7 kgs of 90 %enriched U-235, using the strategy of removing
from each cylinder 0/2 (where 0 i5 the sn of gross weighing measurement by
the inspector and equals 20 kgs of UF6) . For a Pn of 0.95, the critical
amount will be reduced markedly.
The plant operator may not however, use the assumed strategy but some other
one; in that case the significant amount will change. Further work is however,
necessary to find out the optimum significant amounts for a given ß.
In Fig. 5, the probability of detection PD ( = 1-ß) has been shown as a
function of the number of mass spectrometric sampIes analysed (expressed in
terms of manhours required for analysis; two manhours per sampIe) with the
amount M expressed in U-235 as parameter 1).The continuous lines
correspond to sampling plan from both product and tail streams whereas the
see comment 5 table 7
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dotted line shows the sampling plan for the product stream only
(there is some justification for this assumption on account of the
reduced separative work required for 90 %U-235 starting from 3 %).
According to the dotted line, about 25 sampIes (in a total of 130)
will have to be analysed by the inspector to detect an assumed diversion
of an amount equivalent to 10 kgs of U-235 with a probability of detection
of 95 %.
Because of the various possibilities which exist, it is difficult to
assess at this stage, the significant amount, the detection of which can
be ensured by the routine inspection efforts given in Table 9. However,
further work is in progress in this direction.
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Table 1
Relevant Data for the Reference Centrifuge Plant
(all units of amounts are expressed
in t UF6 unless stated otherwise)
Items
Reference plant
Separative work [t U!yr.1
Feed [t UF6!yr, natural uranium)
Product [t UF6!yr, 3 % U-235 ]
Tails ~t UF6!yr, 0.3 %-U-235 J
Waste [i UF6!yr, natural U]
Bateh size
Feed cylinder
(transport cylinder)
Product cylinder
Tail eylinder
Waste corrt a.i.ne r
Inventory
Input
Flanged feed cylinder to the
feed station
Desublimators
Cascade
Gas phase inventory
Hidden inventory
Deposites in centrifuges and pipelines etc.
Content of vacuum traps
Numbers
600
1705
275.5
1439
8.5
10
2
10
1.5
10
0.12
0.3
0.1
continued
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Table 1 continued
Items
Product output
Flanged product cylinder
in the product station
Desublimators
Tail output
Flanged tail cylinder at the
output station
Desublimators
Storage
correspondsto one month production
capacity for the three streams
Numbers
2
10
Table 2
Relevant Data on Batch Sizes and Measurement Errors
for Throughput Measurements
--
1) MSP Chemical Analysis
Items Batches t UF I SD for weighing RSD (in %) RSD (in %) RSD (in %) RSD ( %)
batcR {kg UF61 of random cf systematic of random of systematic
bateh 1 errors errors errors errors
Feed 171 10
Product 129 2
1 0.15 o. 1 0.12 0.15
144 10
Wastes 6 1.5 RSD (in %) of the total measurement
random: 10; systematic: 1
1)B . . b . . l' . .ecause of we2gh2ng y d~fference the systemat~c errors are e lmlnated. The SD glven
varies randomly from cylinder to cylinder.
I
....
-.1
I
Table 3
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Relevant Data on Batch Sizes, Measurement Errors
and Contributions to EMUF
!"_~
Plant areas Contribution to
EMUF
Contribution to
SD of MUF
Lkg UF6/invento~
(RSD of syst.error)
Storage
Feed station
heels in cylinders
(2 kgs UF6/batch)
flanged feed cylinder
desublimators
accurate inventory
estimated inventory
Cascade and traps
gas phase inventory
hidden inventory
hold-up in traps
Product-station
flanged product cylinder
desublimators
accurate inventory
estimated inventory
Tail-station
flanged tail cylinder
desublimators
accurate inventory
estimated inventory
4
(0.15 %ehem.analys.
+ 1 kg weighing)
1
100
(10 %)
16
(0.15 %ehem.analys.
+ 1 kg weighing)
1
100
(10 %)
Table 4
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Contribution of Variances of Throughput (a~) and
Inventory (a~) Measurements to the Standard Deviation of
MUF (aMUF ) for Different Frequencies of Physical Inventory
Taking per Year
Item Physical inventories/yr
2 4 8
2 4
aD(x 10 )
[kg UF/.1 18.96 8.9 4.59 2.84
2 4
aI(x 10 )
[kg UF6
2 ] 0.08 1. 3.06
2. 2.3
1. 3.06
2. 4.84
3. 5.07
4. 2.11
1. 3.06
2. 3.48
3. 4.79
4. 4.84
5. 4.85
6. 4.85
7. 4.85
8. 1. 87
aMUF 437 1• 346 1• 277 1• 243
[kg UF6 J 2. 335 2. 307 2. 2713. 311 3. 276
4. 259 4. 277
5. 277
6. 277
7. 277
8. 217
Table ..2
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Influence of ° for Waste Measurements (oW)
on ° of Throughput Measurements (oD) and 0MUF
Number of
°D °MUF Detection probabilityphysical PD for M c 500 kg UF6inventories/yr [kg UF6] [kg UF6]
with 0w without
°w with 0w without °w with 0w without 0w
1 435 215 437 217 0.31 0.74
°1 = 277 206
°2 = 307 224
4 214 108 0.537 0.891
°3 = 311 232
04 = 259 159
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Table 6
Verification Measures and Activities for
Routine Inspection Efforts
1. Input-stream
Control of seals
Weighing of each feed cylinder with a rough weighing device
Rough enrichment measurement for each feed cylinder with
an enrichment meter
2. Product-and tail-streams
Control of seals
Mass-spectrometric analysis of concentration by random sampling
Estimation of concentrations in each cylinder by enrichment meter
Putting of seals
Weighing of each cylinder with a rough weighing device
3. Waste-stream
E~timation of amount of UF6 in each of the waste containersw~th the same measurement accuracy as those obtained for
operation
4. Physical inventory determination
Presence of inspector during the determination of accurate inventory
or of inventory by estimates
5. Further verification activities
Tag--inventory taking of cylinders in the storage
Verification of records
Calibration of apparatus and instruments
Containment and surveillance activities
Table 7
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Input Data for Estimation of Signifieant Amounts fo~
Diversion on the Basis of Sign Test for Weighing and
Sampling Plant for Isotopie Compositions
tail
1. Verifieation of gross weight for cylinders
n
SD of rough weighing (performed by inspeetor)
Amount assumed to be withdrawable by the plant
operator per eylinder
correspond to 90 %U-2352) in
feed eylinder
product cylinder
tail cylinder
2. Random sampling plan.
SD as in the ease of operator, i.e.
RSD random error 0.15 %, RSD systematic error 0.1 %
Amount assumed to be withdrawable by the
operator
product : 1 %of enrichment 3)
Amount withdrawable by the operator from
% . 4): 5 of concentratlon
Time required for each MSP-measurement ~h]
a
20 kgs UF6
10 kgs UF6
0.045 kgs U
0.3 kgs U
0.01 kgs U
0.4 kgs U-235 5)
0.59 kgs UF6
1 kg U-235 5)
1. 47 kgs UF6
2
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Comments to Table 7
1. The sn of the rough weighing by the inspector has been assumed to
be such that it remains constant for a given cylinder but varies
in a random fashion from cylinder to cylinder.
2. Reference /5/, Table 4.
3. The withdrawable amount results fram the specification given by
the fuel element manufacturers.
4. In principle the operator could reduce the U-235 concentration 1n
tails to very low values so that the withdrawable amount could range
between approximately 0 - 0.3 %. However, such heavy withdrawals
could be detected by simple material balance unless of course the
extracted U-235 amounts were concentrated to very high values.
This would on the other hand require fairly large amount of separative
work. Therefore, a range of + 5 %has been assumed for withdrawal
from tail cylinders.
5. This withdrawal of U-235 has been assumed to be equal to approximately
90 %UF6• The values of the amounts of U-235 diverted were not transferred
to amounts of 90 %U-235 however, as this procedure would result in a
different net amount of diverted U-235 than assumed before in the frame-
work of falsification if isotopic compositions.
Table 8 Sign Test for the Gross Weights of UF6 Cylinders.
Examples of Some Numerical Results. 1)
M M
n Z (0= 0.05) 1-ß(n tO) ['kg U 90 %1 1-ß(5tn-5) Lkg U 90 %Jc
Feed 171 97 0.9998 5.2 0.07 0.9
Product 129 74 0.998 26.5 0.092 6.0
Tails 144 82 0.9992 1.0 0.087 0.2
Sum (a= 0.14) ,.. 1 32.7 0.23 7. 1
1)Explanat ion of the numbers and symbols are given in Annex 3.
I
I\)
~
I
Table 9
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Routine Inspection Effort for the Reference Centrifuge Plant
Note: On the average the reference plant is expected to operate
on a monthly transport and supply basis (i.e. 12 shipments each
for product and tail cylinders per year).
1. Activities for the process MBA (once a month)
Verification of operator's measures e.g.
Operator's weighing, concentration and
isotopic measurements
Rough checking of the gross weights of the UF6 cylinders
Estimation of concentrations
Tag-inventory
Calibration
Sampling
Analysis of waste concentrations
3 IMD per inspection; 12 per year
2. Physical inventory taking
IMD/yr
36
Accurately estimated inventory (once per year) 20
Estimated inventory (4-times a year, 4 IMD per inventory) 16
3. Control of records
4. Additional inspection effort for random sampling
(1 IMD per sampling)
5. Waiting time
1)Since apart of the inspection for inventory estimates and
random sampling can be carried out during the monthly
routine inspections, some of the periods are expected to
overlap.
10
15
15
--rr
100 - 122
Product-
Storage
I INUF6(3 0/0 )
Tails -
Storage
I IN UF6(0,3 0/0)
Product -
Station
Tails -
Station
Tails -
Desubli-
mators
UF6
(03°/0)
#
Product -
Desublimators
~-----------------~I I
O blO- I Cascade Iesu I I I
mators I operotion-jnointencnce-f
land testing - areas Ic_______ _ ~
Feed -
Purification
UF6 (not)
Feed-
Stations
Feed-
Storage
Evacuation
facility
Vac-
pump
To Atmosph.
Etfluent
Treatment
I
ro
0'\
I
Wastes Wastes Waste Slurry ( U nat )
F ig. 1: Schematic flow - sheet tor the reference centrifuge plant
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Storage Process - MBA
MBA
Desub- Feed
limator accessible inaccessible
Waste vac-
trap Maintenance
+
Desub- Tails Testing
limator F
Waste vac-
trap
ProductDesub-
limator p
Fig.l MBAs and Location of KMPs in the
reference centrifuge plant
I
(\)
CP
I
1200 1300 1400 1500
--=>~ M [ kg UF6 ]
11001000900800700600500
1- ß
t
400
0.9
O5 I' , I ' I ' I I. y r r I'
0.3 I / / 1 I 1 1 1 1 I I
O8 I 1'1 ' I -' I I ~ 1 14 r ~ , :7
I I0.7 1 I / I / I / A I
0.4 v V/I 1 1
1.0
06 1 ' I ' I ' , I I• y ~ ~ I'
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Fig. 5 Verification of the isotopic composition of product and tails cylinders :
probability of detection 1- ß as a function of number of analyses/yr with critical amount
M I kq U-235] as parameter. The dotted Une corresponds to the verification of only
product cylinders.
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Annex 1: Evaluation of MUF. 0MUF and Different Probabilities of
Detection for the Reference Centrifuge Plant
,. Definition of MUF
For the considered reference centrifuge plant the MUF (Material Unaccounted
For) is defined as folIows:
MUF :: 1
0
+ D - 1 1
:: 1
0
+ (F-P-T-W)-1 1
I:: 1nventory
F:: Feed
p:: Product
T:: Tails
W:: Wastes
(A,-1)
Due to measurement errors the MUF is a random variable. Under the assumption
that the values are independent from each other (that means neglecting covariance
terms), one obtains for one inventory period the variance var (MUF) from
equation (A1-1) in the following way:
var (MUF) :: var (1
0
) + var (F) + var (p) + var (T) + var (W) + var (I,)
(A1-2)
2. Evaluation of var F1 var p. var T and var W
The safeguarded material is measured batchwi se , that means each batch is
weighed and sampled. Frorn the gross- and tare-weight one obtains the netweight
M. From the sampIe one gets the chemical factor C and the enrichment N.
The U-235-content of the batch i is therefore:
U-235.=M. ·N. ·C.). ). ). ).
M :: netweight
N :: enrichment U-235/(U-235+U-238)
C :: chemical factor UF6/(UF6+impurities) • 0.68
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Because of measurement-errors the errors for a single measurement are
g1ven as follows:
M. =WM.'" ~ ... eMi (A1-4)1 1
N. =WN.'" ~ ... eNi1 1
C. =WC.'" d ... e1 J. c ci
W = true value
d = systematic error
e. = random error
J.
Equation (A1-3) together with equation (A1-4) leads to
U-235. = (WM.'" a . ... eM.) (WN.'" a.. ... eN.) (WC ... d ... e .) (A1-5)1 J. AM 1 1 -n 1 i c C1
The neglection of terms which are small of second order gives
U-235· = WN· • WM.· WC.1 J. 1 1
... WN.• WCi (~ ... eMi)J.
... WM. • WCi (~ ... eNi)J.
... WM.· WN. (d ... e .) (A1-6)1 J. c C1
If one adds all the estimates of the U-235-contents of the single feed-
batches corresponding to eq. (A1-6) one obtains the following estimate
of the total amount of U-235-feed for the considered inventory period
(it is assumed that WM. = WM, WN. =WN, WC. =WC for all i = 1 ••• n):
J. J. J.
Feed == 1: U-235·
. 1
1
= n . WM • WN • WC ...
... WM • WN (n'd ... 1:e .)
c C1
i == 1 •••• n
n =number of feed batches
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The variance var (Feed) is given by the following expression:
var (Feed) = WN2• WC2• (n2 var
'\1+ n'var eM) +
+ WM2•WC2• (n 2 var ~ + n'var eN) +
~ 2 2 e ) (A1-7)+ ·WN • (n -var d + n'var
c c
To show the different influences of the number of batches on the random and
the systematic errors eq. (A1-7) may be vritten in the following form:
var (Feed) = 1 ö2 + 02 + 1 02 + 02
(n' WM'W'WC) 2 n rM sM n rN sN (Al-B)
o =rel. standard deviation (RSD) fo the systematic error
s
ör =RSD of the randem error
Eq.Al-B shows, that the variances of the random errors decrease with increasing
number of batches, while the variances of the systematic errors are independent
of the number of batches.
For the uranium feed eq. (Al-B) simplifies to
var (Feed)
2(n -WM'WC)
1 2 2 1 2 2
=- 0 + 0sM + - ö + 0n rM n rC sC
Eq. (A1-8) and eq. (A1-9) are equivalent for product and tails.
Theoretically for the wastes the same way of establishing the variance is
possible as for feed, product and tails. Because of lack of data concerning
the measurement of wastes for the following numcerical examples the
variance var (W) is vritten in the following way:
var W
2(n- W )
= RSD of the overall random error of the
waste measurement
0sW • RSD of the overall systematic error
of the waste measurement
(Al-l0)
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3. Evaluation of var I
Two different cases are considered:
a) the physical inventory of the plant 1S measured accurately
(dumping of desublimators, emptying vaccuum-traps, etc.)
b) the physical inventory is estimated on operational data.
For the first case the variance var I can be determined with Eq. (A1-8)
because the inventory is measured batchwise.
For the case b the inventory is estimated on the basis of flow rates. This
procedure leads to an accuracy of ca. 10 %. The contents of the transport-
containers flanged at the input and output stations are not added to the
inventory-estimate, they are added to the book inventory.
4. Probability of detection for a potential diversion of nuclear material
based on var (MUF)
4.1 The case of one inventory period
The probability of detection for the potential diversion M of nuclear material
is a function of the error of the first kind Q, the variance var (MUF) and
the amount M. The probability of detection p (which is one minus the error
of the second kind probability ß) is given by
Mp(M)= ~(--- - U )
0MUF 1-a
(A1-11)
Ul-a
Here, ~-1 is the inverse function of the Gaussian distribution function.
0MUF is given by
0MUF = Ivar(MUF) = Ivar I o + var D + var I, (A1-12)
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4.2 Seguence of inventory periods
For a sequence of inventory periods the problem arises to choice the value
for the starting inventory for the next time interval. Three theoretical
possibilities exist for the estimation of the starting inventory: The so
called book inventory, the physical inventory or a combination of both can
be taken as the estimator 1). For the following numerical examples the
maximum likelihood estimate has been chosen for reasons discussed in
ref. /1-2/ and /1-3/. 1t has been assumed that the physical inventory ~s
measured accurately at the beginning and the end of the year, while the
inventories within the year are based on estimated values, as pointed out
in 3.
(Al-13)n[ . JJI U - .!:11
i=l nh-a n- 0MUF_
1-p = ß =
The probability of detection p for the total amount M to be diverted is
given by
Rere, n is the number of inventories per year. 1t has been assumed that
the operator will divert in each inventory period the same fraction M
n
of the total &mount M.
The overall error of the first kind a (i.e. the probability to cause a false
alarm) is connected with the errors of the first kind ai for the single
inventory periods by the following relation
n
l-a = JI (l-a.)
• 1 ~~=
(A1-13a)
For Q, = one obtains
l-a n= (l-a )
o
(Al-13b)
o ~s given by:MUF.
~
= Ivar I . + var D. + var 1 1 .o,~ ~ ,~
(Al-14)
l)For further details see ref. /1-1/.
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5. Numerical examples for the accuracy of the material balance for
the uranium accountancy
The following assumptions have been made to obtain the resulting values:
a) The systematic error of weighing has been eliminated, due to the
facts, that first the gross- and tare-weight of each cylinder is
assumed to be taken on the same scales and second the systematic
error of weighing is independent of the weight.
b) The systematic error of the chemical analysis has been neglected
because it has been assumed that the input- and output-streams
will be measured in the same laboratory with the same systematic
error.
Comment to a) and b)
The net weight M of a UF6 cylinder is determined by the difference
er the gross weight A and the tare weight B. If WA and WB are the true
values, eA and eB are thecorresponding random errors and d the systematic
error (inaependent of the true value) one has
M = (WA + eA + d)-(WB + eB + d)
= WA - WB + e - eA B
therefore
var M = var eA + var "s
This can be shovn also by formally introducing a covariance term:
var M = var eA + var eB + 2 var d - 2 cov (A, B)
As one has
cov (A, B) = E [ (d + eA)(d + eB)] =Ed
2
=var d
one obtains the same result as before.
In the case of the chemical analyses one has systematic errors which are
proportional to the true values:
'" ,.,d = WC • d' d independent of WC
c c' c
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Thus, the variance of the difference betveen feed (F) on one side and product
(p) and tails (T) on the other side is according to eq. (Al-6) given by
Here, n, m, k are the total numbers of feed-, product and tails~
batches for the inventory period considered. Collection of the d
cterms gives
If one neglects the vaste and the physical inventory in this connection
one sees that this term is zero because of material balance reasons.
This could have been shovn again by formally introducing covariance terms.
c) For one inventory period per year the physical inventory viII be
measured exactly at the beginning and at the end of the year. For
n inventory periods per year the physical inventory viII be measured
exactly at the beginning as vell as at the end of the year hovever,
vithin the year the physical inventory viII be estimated.
d) Th • f th t' t 2 f .•e var~ance 0 e es ~ma e Os or the start~ng ~nventory is given by /1/
variance of book inventory of the foregoing
inventory period
2
01 = variance of the estimated physical inventory at the end
of the foregoing inventory period
e) The error of first kind a has been taken constant for one year independent
of the number of inventories per year, which means that for more than
one inventory period per year the error of first kind ai for the considered
inventory period i is given by (see formula (Al-13b»
l-a. =n/1_a for; - 1~ • - •••• n
For the following calculations a value of a =0.05 has been chosen.
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5.1 Evaluation of 0D t 01 and 0MUF for the reference centrifuge plant
The variance var D of the throughput measurement is with the assumptions
made above given by
var D = (n 1+n2+n3)·0; M+
2 2
+ M,( n i' 6rC )
a) The case of one inventory period per year
weighing
feed t chemical analysis
produett chemical analysis
tails t chemical analysis
waste-measurement
(Al-17)
The variance var D of the sum of all throughput measurements in the year
is
var D = 444. ,2
+ '08 t 171· 0 •00 122 )
+ 4·106( 129.0.00122)
+ 108( 144.0.00122)
(for the corresponding data see Table 1 and Table 2 of the main text)
The variance of physical inventory ~s with the data of Table 3 of the
ma~n text given by
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Therefore, the variance var(MUF) is given by
var MUF = var D + 2'var I
4
= 19.11'10
b) The case of four inventory periods per year
In this case the variance var D of the sum of all throughput measurements
~n one inventory period is
var D = 111'1 2
+ 108(43'0,00122)
+ 4.106(33'0,00122)
+ 108(36'0.00122)
+ 2.25.106(1.5'0,1 2+2,25'0.01 2)
The variance of the measured physical inventory is the same as in the
case of one inventory period
var I = 0,078'104
measured
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The variance of the estimated physical inventory is (see Table 3)
In the following the var~ances of the MUF's for the different
inventory periods are g~ven.
First period:
var 10 1:: 0.078'10
4
,
var I 1 1:: 3.02' 10
4
,
var MUF 1:: (0.078+4.59+3.02).10
4
:: 7.69'104
°MUF 1 :: 277 kg UF6
Second period:
var 10 2:: 1 1
, 4:59 + 3.02
var MUF2 :: (1.82+4.59+3.02)'10
4
:: 9.43'104
Third period:
var 10 , 3 :: 2.05'10
4
var MUF3 :: (2.05+4.59+3.02)'10
4
:: 9.66' 104
° :: 311 kg UF6MUF3
-41-
Fourth period:
var 10 4 .. 2.07"0
4
•
var MUF4 ..
.. 259 kg UF6
5.2 Probability of detection p for M .. 1000 kg UF6
a) One inventory period per year
The probability of detection is given by formula (A1-11)
1-p .. ~(U _!1..-))l-a CJ MUF
1-p"~(1.65-
For a .. 0.05 one obtains
M )
CJMUF
.. ~(1.65 - 1~00 .. 0.26
437
This is equivalent to
p .. 0.74
b) Four inventory periods per year
The probability of detection is given by formula (A1-13)
1-p
This is equivalent to
p .. 0.986
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Annex 2: Sign Test for the Verification of the Gross Weights
of UF6 qylinders
1. Principle of the method
It is assumed that the operator 1 ) reports the values of the gross weights
of the UF6 cylinders and that the inspector checks all these reported
data by independent measurements with the help of an own balance. The
inspector thus, can check the reported data within the accuracy of his
own measurement. However, as the measurement of the operator is much more
accurate, one can imagine that the operator falsifies the data by small
amounts which are covered by the measurement error of the inspector's
measurement. In order to be able to detect even such small falsifications
the inspector performs a so-called sign test: He forms the differences
between the single reported data and his own independentmeasurements. If
the two measurements are unbiased and if there exists no falsification
the true values of the differences should be zero. Therefore, the differences
between the measured data should be positive and negative with equal proba-
bility. On the basis of this assumption, the inspector establishes a critical
value of the'positives': thc number of positive differences is larger
than this critical value (which depends on the chosen error of the first
kind) the inspector states that the number of positives is 'significant'
and calls for a second action level.
Remark: It is important to note that in this connection a one sided
test is considered. There is a difference between the input and the
output of the enrichment plant aa one has to aasume that the operator
(in order to gain material) at the input may report a value which is
smaller than in reality whereas at the output he may report a value which
1) h' t th h' . .At t e 1npu e operator of t e enr1cbment plant we1ghs the cyl1nders
only immediately before the cylinders go into the process. Thus, the
inspector cannot check thc weights after they have been reported by the
operator. Here, the can take the reported data of the shipper
of the
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is greater than in reality. As a result of this consideration the
inspector at the input has to test the differences y. - x. (here, y.
111
is the inspector's value, x. is the operator's reported value) whereas
1
at the output he has to test the differences x.- y .•
1 1
In the following, first the test, l.e. the critical value for the number
of positives as a function of the total number of items and the error of
the first kind a is constructed. Thereafter, the error of the second kind
for arbitrary falsification strategies of the operator is derived and special
cases are considered. The results are illustrated by some numerical calcula-
tions.
2. Significance threshold of the test as a function of the total number
of items and error of the first kind a
The probability that out of n differences in total at least z differences
happen to be positive if the probability that a single difference happens
to be positive is p, is given by
F (z; p,n) =
a
(A2-1)
According to the theorem of De Moivre and Laplace, this probability is
approximately given by
z - n·p }F (z; p,n) = ~ (
a In.p(1-p)
(A2-2)
Rere, ~ is the Gaussian distribution function. The zero hypothesis is given
by p =0.5; thus, the error of the first kind a and the significance thres-
o
hold z , the critical number ofpositives, is given by
c
n
La =
vq
c
n v n-v( )p (1-p) = 1-F (z ; P , n)
v 0 0 a c 0
(A2-3)
With the help of (A2-2) one obtains
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n ;n
Z =-+_·U
C 2 2 '-a
where U'-a is the'-a quantile of the Gaussian distribution.
(A2-4)
3. Conditioned probability of detection p as a function of the amount
falsified per cylinder
Let the variance of the differences D of the operator's reported data and
., 2 (the ~nspector s own measurement be o. If the variance of the inspector's
measurement is much worse than that of the operator, the variance of the
difference is essentially g~ven by the variance of the inspector's measurement. )
Then the probability p that the difference between the operator's and the
inspector's measurement is positive, is in the case that the operator
falsifies his measurement by an amount p given by
p = prob {D>O/ED =p, var D = 02}
One obtains from (A2-5)
(~(0.5) = 0.69 l2-\2
=1.(2) 1,for r (A2-6)P P :'<}i0.98 I 20= ,
'-
4. Error of the second kind ß for arbitrary falsification strategiesi
special cases.
It is assumed now that n, items (reported gross weights) are falsified
by an amount p and n2 = n-n, items are not falsified. Then the probability
of detection (which is one minus the error of the second kind ß(n"n2 » is
given by
(A2-7)
Here, a, is the number of positive differences where the operator's reported
data are falsified and a2 is the number of positive differences where no data
are falsified.
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Remark: According to the terminology of eq. (A2-7) one can
write for the error of the first kind
a = l-ß(O,n)
From eq. (A2-7) one obtains
min(zc,n2)
l-ß (n , ,n2 ) = L.
lJ=max(O ,zc-n,)
This gives with the help of eq. (A2-1)
min(zc,n2)
l-ß(n"n2) = -'- L ('-F (z -lJln1,p)(n2)2n2 lJ=max(O,zc-n,) a1 c lJ
or, with the approximation corresponding to eq. (A2-2)
(A2-8)
(A2-9)
n p-(z -lJ) n~(1 c )( 2)
In1. p ( 1- p ) lJ
(A2-10)
Special cases
(i) In the case n1=n, i.e. in the case the operator falsifies
all the data by an amount p, one has
Therefore, one obtains from (A2-10)
np-z
l-ß(n,O)=~( c )
Inp{ l-p)
(A2-11)
(ii) In the case the operator falsifies items by very large amounts
p(~2a) one has p~l and one obtains from (A2-9)
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for n <z <n2 c 1
(A2-12)
Thus, one sees that the operator cannot falsify a great fraction n,
of the items by large amounts without being detected.
(iii) In the case n 1«n, i.e. in the case the operator falsifies only a
small amount of items one has
and from (A2-10) one obtains
(A2-13 )
5. Numerical calculations
In the following, the feed (1), product (2) and tails (3) streams of an
enrichment plant are considered. In Table 8, numerical results are given for
the special cases
(J.0) 0 C1n1 = n, n2 = ,p =2
C1This means all cylinders are falsified by an amount of 2 .
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This means that only few cylinders are falsified by large amounts
compared to the measurement accuracy.(One could imagine that the
inspector performs a test of significance for each single cylinder
which is verified by him. In that case here, the probability to detect
a single falsification would be 0.64 for a a 0.05.)
The three streams are considered separately; this means that separate
sign tests with separately given a errors are performed, and the ß errors
are calculated for each sign test separately.
One can however, determine the overall a and B-errors for all three tests
together as one has
The overall values of the a and B-errors are given in the last row of Table 8.
One sees: even in the case that the probabilities of detection for the
single stream sign test are only in the order of 10 %, the overall probability
of detection is 24 %. (In this case, one should take into account additionally
the possible detection with the help of the above mentioned single cylinder
tests of significance.)
6. Concluding remarks
It has been shown in which way the inspector can verify the operator's
reported data of the gross weights of the UF6 cylinders with the help of
statistical sign tests. The critical number of positives has been calculated
for a given a error and furthermore, the B error has been calculated for two
special falsification strategies.
As it has been mentioned earlier it is important for the inspector
to perform additionally a test of significance for each single cylinder in
order to detect a diversion which is based on large amount falsifications in
small numbers of cylinders. Thus t the problem of the verification of the
gross weights of the UF6 cylinders of the three streams should be formu-
lated in the following way:
Let a,i t i = 't2t3 be the error of the first kind of the sign test for the
i-th stream t and let a2i t i = 1t2 t3 be the error of the first kind of
the sum of the single cylinder tests for the i-th stream. Let ß'i(M1i) and
ß2i (M2i) be the corresponding errors of the second kind and M1i and M2i
the critical amount M for the i-th stream which refer to the corres-
ponding falsifi~ation strategies: defeating of the sign test (M1i) and
defeating of the single cylinder tests (M2i ) . The overall a and ß errors
are then given by
1-a =
ß(M) =
3 3
n (1-a,,) n (1-a2i)i=1 J. i=1
The rigorous treatment would require to minimize ß(M) for a given a
with respect to the Q1i and Q2i t i = 't2t3t and to maximize ß(M) with
respect to the M1i and M2i for a fixed M where
3 3
M = t M,J.' + t M2,i=1 i=1 J.
In the light of this formulation the numerical calculations given above
can only be seen as illustrative examples.
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Annex 3: Verification of the Isotopic Composition of the
Product and Tails Streams by Means of Random Sampling
1. Principle of the method
It is assumed that the inspector verifies the operator's reported data
of the enrichment of the product and tails cylinders by independently
taking and analyzing samples. The randomness of the sampling procedure
of the inspector can be guaranteed provided that the cylinders remain
flanged at the product or the tail station for 4-8 hours after the
sampling of the operator. Thus, the inspector has enough time to decide
whether he should take a sample or not after he has got the operator's data.
With the help of his independent data the inspector checks by means of the
so-called 'D-statistics' whether the reported data are falsified or not: He
forms the differences between the single reported data and his independent
measurements, extrapolates the sum of all these differences to the hypothe-
tical sum of the differences with respect ot all reported data and performs
a test of significance for this sum cf differences ('D').
As there exist two different sets of cylinders (product and tails) with
different characteristics, the problem arises to distribute the verification
effort in an optimal way on the two sets of cylinders. This optimisation
procedure has been subject of different papers 13-1, 3-2/ and shall not
be repeated here.
In the following the relevant formulae are summarized and some numerical
calculations are presented.
2. List of formulae and numerical results
The relation between the basic parameters
Cl error of the first kind
s error of the second kind
M critical amount
C total verification effort
(A3-1 )
-51-
is glven by the following expression
U'_ß ·oD/H = M-U 1_doD/H1 0
Here, U is the quantile of the normal distribution. The variances o~/H and
a~/H of the D-statistics undertie zero hypothesis (no diversion) ando
under the alternative hypothesis (critical amount M) are given by
2
° IHD 0
1
=-C
2 2
1: ;;;:N.a.)
111
i=1
(A3-2)
1 2 222
= - ( 1: ~ N. S.) - 1: N. p. ( 1-p. ). lJ •
C i=1 1 1 1 i=1 1 1 1 1
where
102 ( ) 2S. = . + p. 1-p. lJ.
1 1 1 1 1
r.
p. =-!.
1 N.
1
Here, the index i refers to the two sets of cylinders (product 1, tails 2).
The single parameters have the following meaning:
Yariance of the difference of the single comparison: operator's
reported value-inspector's own finding
N.
1
e.
1
r.
1
lJ.
1
total number of cylinders in a single set
effort for the verification of a single cylinder 1)
number of falsified data
falsified amount per cylinder
The optimal number of cylinders to be verified in the i-th set (i=1,2) is
given by
opt
n. = C •
1
S.N.
1 1
rr: 2 I-
re. E re.N.S.
1 j=1 <1 J J i = 1,2 (A3-4)
1) .. dHere, lt lS assume e 1 =e = 2h2
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The optimal number of cylinders to be falsified in the i-th set is
given (to a first approximation, as the exact figure cannot be given
analytically)
opt =M'r.
~
e.N.
~ ~
1:
.e .v .x.
J J J J
(A3-5 )
The numerical values of the parameters 0., r., lJ. are given in Table 1.
~ ~ ~
The results of the numerical calculations are presented in Fig. 5 for two
different values of the critical amount M (in kg U235) and error of
the first kind a = 0.05 as a function of the total effort C. As e =2h,
0.5·C is the total sample size for the two sets of cylinders. The dashed
line corresponds to the case where only the product cylinders are verified
(and, consequently, assumed to be falsified).
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